Let N1 = p1q1 and N2 = p2q2 be two RSA moduli, not necessarily of the same bit-size. In 2009, May and Ritzenhofen proposed a method to factor N1 and N2 given the implicit information that p1 and p2 share an amount of least significant bits. In this paper, we propose a generalization of their attack as follows: suppose that some unknown multiples a1p1 and a2p2 of the prime factors p1 and p2 share an amount of their Most Significant Bits (MSBs) or an amount of their Least Significant Bits (LSBs). Using a method based on the continued fraction algorithm, we propose a method that leads to the factorization of N1 and N2. Using simultaneous diophantine approximations and lattice reduction, we extend the method to factor k ≥ 3 RSA moduli Ni = piqi, i = 1, . . . , k given the implicit information that there exist unknown multiples a1p1, . . . , a k p k sharing an amount of their MSBs or their LSBs. Also, this paper extends many previous works where similar results were obtained when the pi's share their MSBs or their LSBs.
Introduction
Research in determining pre-requisites for strong primes for the integer factorization problem (IFP) of a product of two primes N = pq has been intriguing and have captured the attention of researchers since IFP came into prominence via the RSA algorithm. The simplicity of the problem statement raised interest on whether such a simple problem statement describing the IFP could only be solved in exponential time for all cases, i.e. all types of primes. As can be found in the literature, this is not the case. So-called weak primes were identified by researchers and this caused an avalanche of research output on this matter. In this paper, we focus on IFP when N = pq is unbalanced, that is when q is much smaller than p.
In PKC 2009, May and Ritzenhofen [5] presented a method for factoring large integers with some implicit hints. More precisely, let N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli of the same bit-size such that q 1 and q 2 are α-bit primes and p 1 and p 2 share at least t least significant bits (LSBs). The method of May and Ritzenhofen is a lattice based method that allows to find the factorization of N 1 and N 2 when t ≥ 2α + 3. May and Ritzenhofen's method heuristically generalizes to a lattice based method to simultaneously factor k RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k when the p i 's share t ≥ k k−1 α many LSBs. In [8] , Sarkar and Maitra reconsidered the method of May and Ritzenhofen for two RSA moduli. Sarkar and Maitra's method works when N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 are such that p 1 and p 2 share their LSBs or most significant bits (MSBs) as well as a contiguous portion of bits at the middle.
In PKC 2010, Faugère, Marinier and Renault [1] presented a new and rigorous lattice-based method that addresses the implicit factoring problem when p 1 and p 2 share t MSBs. Moreover, when N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 are two RSA moduli of the same bit-size and the prime factors q i are α-bit primes, the method of Faugère et al. provably factors N 1 and N 2 as soon as p 1 and p 2 share t ≥ 2α + 3 MSBs. The method heuristically generalizes to the case when p 1 and p 2 share an amount of bits in the middle. It also heuristically generalizes to k RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k when the p i 's share t ≥ k k−1 α + 6 of MSBs. In IWSEC 2013, Kurosawa and Ueda [3] presented a lattice-based method to factor two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 of the same bit size when p 1 and p 2 share t LSBs with t ≥ 2α + 1 where q 1 ≈ q 2 ≈ 2 α . Their method takes advantage on using Gaussian reduction techniques. It slightly improves the bound t ≥ 2α + 3 of May and Ritzenhofen. We notice that Kurosawa and Ueda did not study a number of possible extensions of their method, namely, when p 1 and p 2 share t MSBs and also when the multiple of the primes share LSB's and MSB's.
All the former attacks apply when the RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , . . . , N k = p k q k are of the same bit-size and the p i 's share an amount of MSBs, LSBs or bits in the middle. In this paper, we present novel approaches of implicit factoring that generalize the former attacks and apply when some unknown multiples a i p i of the prime factors p i share an amount of MSBs or of LSBs.
Our first method concerns two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 of arbitrarily sizes in the situation that there exist two integers a 1 , a 2 such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t many MSBs. We show that, using the continued fraction expansion of N2 N1 , one can factor simultaneously N 1 and N 2 whenever |a 1 p 1 −a 2 p 2 | < p1 2a2q1q2 . In particular, when N 1 and N 2 are of the same bit size and q 1 , q 2 are α-bit primes, then one can factor N 1 and N 2 whenever a i ≤ 2 β for i = 1, 2 and t ≥ 2α+2β +1. When β = 0, that is a 1 = a 2 = 1, our result becomes t ≥ 2α + 1 and improves the bound t ≥ 2α + 3 presented in [8] and [1] where the methods are based on lattice reduction techniques.
Our second method is a heuristic generalization of the first method to an arbitrary number k ≥ 3 of RSA moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k in the situation that there exist k integers a i such that the a i p i 's share t many MSBs. When the RSA moduli are of the same bit size and the factors q i , i = 1, . . . , k, are α-bit primes, the method allows us to factor the RSA moduli as soon as
where β is such that a i ≤ 2 β . Once again, with β = 0, we improve the bound presented in the attack of [1] . Our third method addresses the implicit factoring problem when two unbalanced RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 of arbitrarily sizes are such that there exist two integers a 1 and a 2 such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t many LSBs. We show that it is possible to factor both N 1 and N 2 if a 1 a 2 q 1 q 2 < 2 t−1 . This method is also based on the continued fraction algorithm, applied to T 2 t where T ≡ N 2 N −1 1 (mod 2 t ). We notice that, when a 1 = a 2 = 1 and q 1 , q 2 are α-bit primes, the former condition on t transforms to t ≥ 2α + 1 which improves the bound on t for LSBs in [5] and [8] and retrieves the bound of [3] .
Our fourth method is a generalization of the third method to k ≥ 3 RSA moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k. Assume that there exist k integers a i such that the a i p i 's share t many LSBs. If the RSA moduli are of the same bit size and the q i 's are α-bit primes, our method allows us to address the implicit factoring problem whenever t satisfies (1) where β is such that a i ≤ 2 β .
In fact our findings under the four scenarios, further discus possible malicious key generation of RSA moduli by observing not only the difference between primes, but also the differences of the multiple of primes. At the same time it generalizes the previous works by [5] , [8] , [1] and [3] . Contrarily to the previous works, we study all the possible situations involving k = 2 as well as k ≥ 3 in both cases of MSBs and LSBs. In Table 1 , we compare the applicability of our methods against the previous methods for the different scenarios. Also, we notice that not only the new bounds improve the previous ones, but also that the rank of the new underlying lattices are often lower than the ranks of the lattices used in the former methods. In Table 2 and Table 3 , we compare our results against the former results with k RSA moduli in terms of bounds and dimension of the lattices.
We apply our results to the implicit factorization of k ≥ 2 RSA for Paranoids [7] N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k, where p i ≈ 2 4500 and q i ≈ 2 500 . For example, we show that we can easily factor two RSA for Paranoids moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 if there exist two integers a 1 and a 2 such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t MSBs or t LSBs with t ≥ 1001 + 2β where β is such that a i ≤ 2 β for i = 1, 2. For q1 ≈ q2 ≈ 2 α and |p1 − p2| < 2 t , the bound is heuristically better than t ≥ 2α+3 and the dimension of the lattice is at least 9 (m = t = 1).
Can not be applied
Our results
For q1 ≈ q2 ≈ 2 α and |a1p1 − a2p2| < 2 t for some unknown integers a1, a2 ≤ 2 β , the rigorous bound is t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1 using the continued fraction algorithm. For a1 = a2 = 1, β = 0 and the the rigorous bound is t ≥ 2α + 1.
For q1 ≈ . . . ≈ q k ≈ 2 α and |aipi − ajpj| < 2 t for some unknown integers a1, . . . , a k , the heuristic bound is t > k k−1 α + 
Sarkar, Maitra [8] For q1 ≈ q2 ≈ 2 α and p1 ≡ p2 (mod 2 t ), the bound is heuristically better than t ≥ 2α+3 and the dimension of the lattice is at least 9 (m = t = 1).
Can not be applied.
Faugère et al. [1]
Not studied. Not studied.
Kurosawa, Ueda [3]
For q1 ≈ q2 ≈ 2 α and p1 ≡ p2 (mod 2 t ), the rigorous bound is t ≥ 3α + 1 using 2dimensional lattices of Z 2 .
Our results
For q1 ≈ . . . ≈ q k ≈ 2 α and aipi ≡ ajpj (mod 2 t ) for some unknown integers a1, . . . , a k , the heuristic bound is t >
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some useful background on continued fractions and lattice basis reduction. In section 3, we present our first method to address the problem of implicit factoring of two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 when a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t MSBs.
In section 4, we present a generalization to k ≥ 3 RSA moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k, in the situation that the a i p i 's share t MSBs. In section 5, we present an attack on two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 when a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t LSBs and we generalize this attack to k ≥ 3 RSA moduli in Section 6. In Section 7, we present our experiments and we conclude in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review some knowledge background on continued fractions and lattice basis reduction.
Continued fractions
First we give the definition of continued fractions and state a related theorem. The details can be referenced in [2] . For any positive real number ξ, define ξ 0 = ξ and for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, a i = ξ i , ξ i+1 = 1/(ξ i − a i ) unless ξ n is an integer. Then ξ can be expanded as a continued fraction in the following form
which, for simplicity, can be rewritten as ξ = [a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n , . . .]. If ξ is a rational number, then the process of calculating the continued fraction expansion would be finished in some finite index n and then ξ = [a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ]. The convergents a b of ξ are the fractions defined by a b = [a 0 , . . . , a i ] for i ≥ 0. We note that, if ξ = a b is a rational number, then the continued fraction expansion of ξ is finite with the total number of convergents being polynomial in log(b).
Another important result on continued fractions that will be used throughout this paper is the following (Theorem 184 of [2] ). 
Then a b is one of the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of ξ.
Lattice reduction
Let us present some basics on lattice reduction techniques. Let b 1 . . . , b d be d linearly independent vectors of R n with d ≤ n. The set of all integer linear combinations of the b i forms a lattice L. Namely,
The integer n is the rank of the lattice L and d is its dimension. The set 
On the other hand, for comparison, the Gaussian Heuristic says that the length of the shortest non-zero vector of a lattice L is usually approximately σ(L) where
Factoring two RSA Moduli in the MSB Case
In this section, we study the problem of factoring two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 where a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 coincide on the t most significant bits (MSBs), that is when |a 2 p 2 − a 1 p 1 | is sufficiently small.
The general attack for two RSA Moduli in the MSB Case
We begin by the following result which applies to two RSA moduli not necessarily of the same bit size. Theorem 3. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli. If there exist two integers a 1 , a 2 such that a 1 < p 2 , a 2 < p 1 and |a 1 p 1 − a 2 p 2 | < p1 2a2q1q2 , then one can factor N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time.
Proof. For N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 , let x = a 1 p 1 − a 2 p 2 . Multiplying x by q 2 , we get a 1 p 1 q 2 − a 2 N 2 = xq 2 . Suppose that |x| < p1 2a2q1q2 . Then, dividing by a 2 N 1 = a 2 p 1 q 1 , we get
Hence, from Theorem 1, it follows that a1q2 a2q1 , in lowest term is one of the convergents in the continued fraction expansion of N2 N1 . If we assume a 1 < p 2 , a 2 < p 1 , then using a1q2 a2q1 , we get q 1 = gcd(N 1 , a 2 q 1 ) and therefore p 1 = N1 q1 . Similarly, we get q 2 = gcd(N 2 , a 1 q 2 ) and p 2 = N2 q2 . Each convergent a b of N2 N1 is a candidate for a1q2 a2q1 and the good one will reveal q 1 and q 2 if the conditions of Theorem 3 are fulfilled. Indeed, the 40th convergent is a b = 1351300027964332 8618068847003717463 and gives
We notice that p 1 and p 2 do not share any amount of LSBst nor MSBs nor bits in the middle. This shows that the attacks presented in [8] and [1] will not give a result in this situation.
Application to unbalanced RSA and RSA for Paranoids
As an application of Theorem 3 to factor two unbalanced RSA moduli of the same bit-size, we get the following result.
Corollary 1.
Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two unbalanced RSA moduli of the same bit-size n. Suppose that q i ≈ 2 α , p i ≈ 2 n−α for i = 1, 2. Let a 1 , a 2 be two integers such that a i ≤ 2 β , i = 1, 2. If a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t most significant bits with t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1, then one can factor N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time.
Proof. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli with N 1 ≈ N 2 ≈ 2 n and q 1 ≈ q 2 ≈ 2 α . Suppose that a multiple a 1 p 1 and a multiple a 2 p 2 share the t most significant bits, that is a 1 p 1 − a 2 p 2 = x with |x| ≤ 2 n−α+β−t . Assume that t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1. Then
which can be transformed into the inequality |x| < p1 2a2q1q2 . Hence, as in Theorem 3, it follows that a1q2 a2q1 is a convergent of the continued fraction of N2 N1 which leads to the factorization of N 1 and N 2 .
Remark 2. If we consider β = 0 in Corollary 1, that is, if a 1 = a 2 = 1, a sufficient condition to factor the two RSA moduli is t ≥ 2α + 1 which slightly improves the bound t ≥ 2α + 3 found by Faugère et al. in [1] . This shows that the bound found by Faugère et al. with lattice reduction techniques can be achieved using the continued fraction algorithm instead.
Consider two RSA for Paranoids moduli N i = p i q i with N i ≈ 2 5000 , q i ≈ 2 500 and p i ≈ 2 4500 for i = 1, 2. Then α = 500 and by Corollary 1, it is possible to factor N 1 and N 2 if a multiple a 1 p 1 and a multiple a 2 p 2 share the t MSBs whenever t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1, that is whenever t ≥ 1001 + 2β.
Factoring k RSA Moduli in the MSB Case
The attack mounted for two RSA moduli can be generalized to an arbitrary number k ≥ 3 of moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1 . . . , k where the q i 's are α-bit primes and the a i p i 's share t MSBs. Instead of using the continued fraction algorithm, we use a lattice based method to find simultaneous diophantine approximations. Theorem 4. Let N i = p i q i , i = 1 . . . , k, be k ≥ 3 n-bit RSA moduli where the q i 's are α-bit primes. Suppose that there exist k integers a 1 , . . . , a k with a i ≤ 2 β , i = 1, . . . , k, such that the a i p i 's share all t most significant bits. If
then, under the Gaussian Heuristic assumption, one can factor the k RSA moduli N 1 , · · · , N k in polynomial time.
Proof. For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, we set x i = a i p i − a 1 p 1 . Then, multiplying by q 1 q i , we get
Multiplying by a ai , we get
Let C be a number to be fixed later. Consider the vector v = Caq 1 , aq 1 q 2 x 2 a 2 , . . . ,
Then
Let L be the lattice defined by the rows of M . The dimension of L is k and the determinant is det(L) = CN k−1
1
. The Gaussian Heuristic for L asserts that the length of its shortest non-zero vector is usually σ(L) where
If we choose C such that σ(L) > v , then v can be found among the shortest non-zero vectors of the lattice L. Using (2), we get
Suppose that for i = 1, . . . , k, we have
Moreover, suppose that the a i p i 's share all t MSBs. Then, for i ≥ 2, we have
Hence (4) leads to
On the other hand, using N i ≈ 2 n in (3), we get
Plugging C ≥ 2 n−t and extracting t, we get
(1 + log 2 (πe)) .
Using (2), we get q 1 = gcd(Caq 1 , N 1 ) and for i = 2, . . . , k, q i = gcd( aa1qi ai , N i ). This terminates the proof.
We notice that with β = 0, that is a i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k, we get
which slightly improves the bound obtained by Faugère et al. in [1] . This shows that our result extends the result of Faugère et al. where they considered only the case when the p i 's share t MSBs.
Factoring Two RSA Moduli in the LSB Case
The study of implicit factorization when p 1 , p 2 share some LSBs has been considered in [5] , [8] , [1] and [3] . In this section, we extend the former attacks to the case where an unknown multiple a 1 p 1 of p 1 and an unknown multiple a 2 p 2 of p 2 share their t LSBs.
The general attack
Theorem 5. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli. Assume that there exist two integers a 1 , a 2 with a 1 < p 2 , a 2 < p 1 such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t many LSBs. If a 1 a 2 q 1 q 2 < 2 t−1 , then one can factor N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time.
Proof. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 and N 2 = p 2 q 2 . Assume that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t many LSBs. Then a 1 p 1 − a 2 p 2 = 2 t x for some integer x and we have
Then N 1 a 1 q 2 − N 2 a 2 q 1 ≡ 0 (mod 2 t ). Since gcd(N 1 , 2) = 1, then N −1 1 (mod 2 t ) exists and a 1 q 2 −a 2 q 1 N 2 N −1
Then a 1 q 2 − a 2 q 1 T ≡ 0 (mod 2 t ) and there exists an integer y such that
Suppose that a 1 a 2 q 1 q 2 < 2 t−1 . Then dividing by 2 t a 2 q 1 , we get
Therefore from Theorem 1, it follows that y a2q1 is one of the convergents in the continued fraction expansion of T 2 t . Since a 2 < p 1 , we get q 1 = gcd(N 1, a 2 q 1 ) and p 1 = N1 q1 . Using (5), we get a 1 q 2 = a 2 q 1 T − 2 t y. Similarly, since a 1 < p 2 , we get q 2 = gcd(N 2 , a 1 q 2 ) and p 2 = N2 q2 . This terminates the proof.
Application to unbalanced RSA and RSA for Paranoids
Here we apply Theorem 5 in the situation that the two RSA moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 are of the same shape, that is N 1 and N 2 are of the same bit-size and the q i 's are α-bit primes.
Corollary 2.
Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two unbalanced n-bit size RSA moduli with q 1 ≈ q 2 ≈ 2 α . Suppose that there exist two positive integers a 1 ≤ 2 β , a 2 ≤ 2 β such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share the t LSBs. If t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1, then one can factor N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time.
Proof. Let N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 be two RSA moduli with N 1 ≈ N 2 ≈ 2 n and, q 1 ≈ q 2 ≈ 2 α . Suppose that a multiple a 1 p 1 and a multiple a 2 p 2 share the t least significant bits where a i ≤ 2 β for i = 1, 2. Define T ≡ N 2 N −1 1 (mod 2 t ). As in the proof of Theorem 5, we have a 1 p 1 − a 2 p 2 = 2 t x and a 1 q 2 = a 2 q 1 T − 2 t y for some integers x and y. Suppose that t ≥ 2α + 2β + 1. Then a 1 a 2 q 1 q 2 < 2 2β+2α ≤ 2 t−1 . Therefore, using the same arguments than Theorem 5, we conclude that y a2q1 is one of the convergents in the continued fraction expansion of T 2 t which leads to the factorization of N 1 and N 2 .
Remark 3.
Here again, if β = 0, then the condition of Corollary 2 becomes t ≥ 2α + 1 which improves the bounds found in the former approaches of [5] , [8] , [1] and retrieves the bound of [3] .
As an application of Corollary 2, consider two 1024-bit RSA for Paranoids moduli N 1 = p 1 q 1 , N 2 = p 2 q 2 where q 1 , q 2 are 500-bit primes. Hence α = 500 and using Corollary 2, one can factor N 1 and N 2 if there exist two integers a 1 ≤ 2 β and a 2 ≤ 2 β such that a 1 p 1 and a 2 p 2 share t LSBs with t > 2001 + 2β.
Factoring k RSA Moduli in the LSB Case
In this section, we assume that we are given k ≥ 3 different RSA moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k where some unknown multiples a i p i 's coincide on the t least significant bits. For suitably large t, we show that there is an efficient algorithm that recovers the factorization of the k RSA moduli. To this end, we use the lattice reduction techniques to solve a simultaneous diophantine approximations problem. Theorem 6. Let N i = p i q i , i = 1 . . . , k, be k ≥ 3 n-bit RSA moduli where the q i 's are α-bit primes. Suppose that there exist k positive integers a 1 , . . . , a k with a i ≤ 2 β , i = 1, . . . , k, such that the a i p i 's share all t least significant bits. If
then, under the Gaussian Heuristic assumption, one can factor the k RSA moduli N 1 , · · · N k in polynomial time.
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, suppose that the a i p i 's share t least significant bits. Then,
Transforming modulo 2 t , we get aq
(mod 2 t ). Then aq 1 T i − aa1qi ai ≡ 0 (mod 2 t ) and there exists an integer y i such that
Let L be the lattice defined by the rows of the matrix M . The dimension of L is k and the determinant is det(L) = 2 (k−1)t . The Gaussian Heuristics for L asserts that the length of its shortest non-zero vector is σ(L) where
Observe that the norm of v satisfies
If the a i p i 's share all t least significant bits, then, for i = 1, . . . , k, we have
Hence v 2 < 2 2kβ+2α + (k − 1)2 2kβ+2α = k2 2kβ+2α .
Using (8) and (7) and transforming σ(L) 2 > v 2 into k 2πe 2
Using (6), we get q 1 = gcd(aq 1 , N 1 ) and for i = 2, . . . , k, q i = gcd( aa1qi ai , N i ). This terminates the proof.
Once again, if β = 0, then a i = 1 and the bound of Theorem 6 transforms to t > k k−1 α + k 2(k−1) (1 + log 2 (πe)) , which improves the bound of [1] .
Experiments
In this section, we describe the experiments that we conducted for k = 4, 10, 30 and 50 RSA moduli, in connection with Theorem 4 and Theorem 6. We verified our assumptions by running experiments on a Core2 Duo 2GHz notebook. The lattice reduction basis technique was based on the LLL algorithm. Assume that a 1 p 1 and the a i p i 's share t MSBs. Then since a i p i ≤ 2 n−α+β , we see that |a i p i − a 1 p 1 | ≤ 2 n−α+β−t . Therefore, t ≤ n − α + β. Similarly, assume that a 1 p 1 and the a i p i 's share t LSBs. Then |a i p i − a 1 p 1 | = 2 t x i with t ≤ n − α + β. In both cases, combining with the bound of t in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we get
which is satisfied if β < n(k − 1)
Consequently, we only consider the situation where the bit-size β of the a i 's satisfies condition (9). We generated many random 1024-bit RSA moduli for k = 4, 10, 30, 50 and various values of α and β according to the bound (9). All our experiments were successful and the assumptions on the Gaussian Heuristics were verified. In Table 4, we notice the experimentally lowest values of t that have 100% success rate.
Conclusion
In this work we have designed a technique to factor k ≥ 2 RSA moduli N i = p i q i , i = 1, . . . , k when some unknown multiples a i p i share t many Most Significant Bits (MSBs) or t many Least Significant Bits (LSBs). The new technique generalizes many previous results where the prime factors p i share t many MSBs or t many LSBs. This provides practitioners tighter conditions for the primes
